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Expert Judgement of Probability and Risk
GeorgeWright, Fergus Bolger and Gene Rowe
This chapter reviews extant research on the quality of expert judge-
ment of probability and risk. Both types of judgement are of great
relevance to the concerns of this book, because expert judgement
under uncertainty is a key component in the making of decisions
with scant information.
In the first section, we focus on the conditions under which experts
have produced high quality assessments of probability – in terms
of both the coherence and validity of assessed probabilities. We
conclude that invalid probability judgements are common when
features of the judgement domain are unfavourable and “learn-
ability” is low – by which we mean that there is a lack of relevant
background data and/or outcome feedback upon which to base
and revise domain models. We identify judgement situations when
such conditions are likely to be prevalent. We also show that
use of ill-matched probability elicitation methods are a common
operational flaw. We propose a task taxonomy that can be used
to identify when expert probability judgements are likely to be
well-made.
Next, we consider whether expert judgements of risk – by which
we mean judgements of the likelihood of occurrence of haz-
ardous events – are of higher quality than those made by mem-
bers of the general public. We evaluate the nine empirical stud-
ies that have been conducted on expert versus lay judgements
of risk, and find that there is little empirical evidence for the
propositions (1) that experts judge risk differently from mem-
bers of the public or (2) that experts are more veridical in
their risk assessments. We discuss the nature of expertise and
consider whether the commonsense assumption of the superior-
ity of expert risk assessors in making magnitude judgements is,
in fact, sensible. We end with a discussion of future research
directions.
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Expert judgement of probability
Expert judgement about uncertainty can be expressed and elicited in many
ways – for example, as verbal probability expressions, numerical proba-
bilities, odds, certainty factors, fuzzy sets and second order probabilities.
The literature on behavioural decision-making has focused almost entirely
on subjective probability because of the philosophical attractiveness of the
axiom base which leads, logically, to expected utility as a choice princi-
ple. Expected utility underpins decision analysis (Goodwin and Wright,
2004), while subjective probabilities are used in forecasting techniques
such as cross-impact analysis (Dalkey, 1972; Wright and Ayton, 1987). In
expert system approaches to decision support, subjective probabilities are
also a widely used way of representing the degrees of belief of experts
(Kanal and Lemmer, 1986; Lemmer and Kanal, 1988; Shafer, 1987; Tonn
et al., 1992). However, what do we know about the quality of expert prob-
ability judgement? If the probability assessments elicited from domain
experts are poor in some respect, then the decisions of any decision-
aiding technique or system which uses these probabilities will also be poor.
Alternatively, if experts are capable of providing high quality probabil-
ity assessments then poorly designed elicitation techniques may degrade
this ability. Ensuring the quality of expert probability judgement is, there-
fore, of major practical importance to the implementation of decision
support.
Two of the most commonly used approaches to the assessment of the qual-
ity of probability judgements are coherence and calibration. By coherence, we
mean the extent to which a probability assessor’s forecasts conform to the
axioms of probability theory. For instance, according to one axiom of prob-
ability theory – additivity – the component probabilities of a set of mutually
exclusive and exhaustive events should add up to one. Another axiom is the
intersection law, which states that the probability of event A and event B
both happening is the product of the probability of event A multiplied by
the probability of event B, given that event A has happened. More formally,
p(A and B) = p(A)P(B|A). Other probability laws determine other relation-
ships between such “complex” probabilities and their “simple” components
of marginal and conditional probabilities. In studies of coherence, probabil-
ity judgements are assessed in terms of the extent to which they conform to
axioms, which basically means that the judgements are consistent or reliable
(see Goodwin and Wright, 2004; Yates, 1990). In studies of calibration, prob-
ability judgements are validated against an external objective standard. For
perfect calibration, a set of events all allocated a 0.XX probability of occur-
rence by a forecaster should, in actual fact, occur on XX% of occasions. For
example, if we examined all the days where a perfectly calibrated weather
forecaster assessed the probability of rain to be 0.7, then we should find the
true proportion of rainy days also to be 0.7 (see Lichtenstein et al., 1982;
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Yates, 1990 for reviews). Calibration is, therefore, a measure of the validity
of a set of subjective probability assessments.
It has been argued that coherence and calibration are logically interrelated
in the same way that reliability and validity are related in measurement the-
ory (Wallsten and Budescu, 1983; Wright and Ayton, 1987). Reliability is
usually regarded as a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite for validity. In
terms of analogy, valid judgements must be reliable, but reliable judgements
are not necessarily valid (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). For example, a metre
rule which is actually 99 cm long will give reliable but non-valid measure-
ments. However, an elastic rule which changes length from time to time is
both unreliable and, generally, invalid. Thus, a coherent judge has the poten-
tial to be well-calibrated but an incoherent judge is, logically, incapable of
being systematically well-calibrated.
Research on calibration and coherence
Research on the quality of calibration performance of experts’ probability
assessments – usually with respect to forecasting performance – has been
found, in several instances, to be very good; for example, Kabus (1976)
(financial interest rates); Hoerl and Fallin (1974) (horse racing); Keren (1987)
(the card game, Bridge); and, as we shall discuss in detail later, most strik-
ingly in weather forecasting – Murphy and Brown (1985). Conversely, in
several instances poor calibration has been found e.g. Oskamp (1965) (clini-
cal psychologists); Wallace (1923) (maize judges). One explanation for those
instances, where poor expert calibration has been found, might be lack of
coherence (recall the argument relating reliability and validity).
A number of studies have demonstrated incoherence in students’ proba-
bility judgement using paper-and-pencil tasks (e.g. Kahneman et al., 1982;
Yates, 1990), although we have located only a few studies of (in)coherence
in experts. For example, Eddy (1982) reviewed medical literature on the
diagnosis of breast cancer from X-rays and found that physicians misunder-
stood the relationship between marginal probabilities (e.g. the probability
of cancer, the probability of positive test, etc.) and conditional probabilities
(e.g. the probability of a positive test given cancer). However, Schafer et al.
(1977) found that, in two out of three tests, people who self-rated as more
knowledgeable than their peers in soccer and statistics were slightly more
coherent than those who rated themselves as less knowledgeable. In a study
of coherence of self-rated experts in snooker, we found self-rated experts
more coherent in their judgements of the probability of the union of two
events than self-rated novices (Wright et al., 1994). Yet again, in a study of
professional restaurant managers, Dube-Rioux and Russo (1988) found fail-
ure to conform to the additivity axiom with respect to the disjunction and
conjunction of probable causes of restaurant failure. Finally, DuCharme and
Peterson (1968) and Youseff and Peterson (1973) found that the failure to
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revise probabilities in the light of new information required by Bayes’ theo-
rem was less marked in real-world tasks than had been previously found in
the laboratory (e.g. Phillips and Edwards, 1966; Phillips et al., 1966).
Thus, as with calibration, the picture with respect to coherence is unclear.
Experts sometimes demonstrate incoherence of the sort found in naive
judges, but there is a suggestion that specific knowledge/expertise may, in
some cases, lead to a reduction in the extent of this incoherence. Given this
tension in the literature, it remains to be demonstrated that it is incoherence
which is responsible for poor calibration. For example, it might plausibly
be argued that incoherence and miscalibration are both symptoms of poor
probabilistic judgement. In fact, there are a number of psychological expla-
nations for poorly calibrated probability judgement (see, e.g. McClelland
and Bolger, 1994). We shall examine some of these other possible causes of
poor calibration performance in probabilistic judgement shortly. However,
it should be noted that there is a sizeable literature that shows random error
in probability judgements can explain much of the observed miscalibration,
although not all (see Ayton and McClelland, 1997 for a review).
Decomposition-recomposition
Most procedures for producing coherent probability judgements involve a
technique called decomposition-recomposition. For example, consider the
abstract example of assessing the probability of drawing two consecutive
aces from a pack of 52 cards. This probability (without replacement) is
p(2 aces)= 4/52 ∗ 3/51 = 12/2652 = 0.00452.
Intuitively, it would seem that most people could, with a little thought, accu-
rately assess the probability of drawing an ace on the first draw and the
probability of a subsequent second ace. It also seems intuitively reasonable
that most people could not make an accurate mental computation of the
probability of the intersection of the two events. On the basis of the obser-
vation that most incoherence is manifest when judges attempt to revise or
combine probabilities, it has been assumed that it is difficulties in compu-
tation (not probabilistic estimation per se) which lead to errors. Thus, it has
been proposed that judgement problems should be broken up (decomposed)
into small elements for which judges supply probability estimates. Proba-
bility assessments are then reproduced by mechanistically combining the
individual component judgements on the basis of the laws of probability
theory (a process known as recomposition).
Decomposition-recomposition has been shown to produce more coherent
complex probabilities than those assessed by judges holistically (e.g. Edwards
et al., 1968), but are the probabilities more valid, for example, in terms of cal-
ibration? Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence available to answer
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this question. Wright et al. (1988) found that calibration of unions, intersec-
tion and disjunctions of events which were mechanically recomposed from
marginal and conditional assessments were no better calibrated than holisti-
cally judged forecast probabilities for the same events. Further, no significant
correlation was found between the coherence and the subsequent calibration
of the assessed probabilities. Wright et al.’s (1994) study also found no rela-
tionship between an assessor’s degree of incoherence and his or her degree of
(mis)calibration, thereby also suggesting that increasing a person’s degree of
coherence will not necessarily increase that person’s calibration. Why should
this be the case?
Greater reliability does not necessarily imply greater validity, although
greater validity does imply greater reliability. Thus, poor calibration may
be due to factors other than poor coherence. Suggestions include memory
problems, use of heuristics, insensitivity to task difficulty and confirmation
biases (see e.g. Compte and Postlewaite, 2004; Dougherty et al., 1999; Ferrell
and McGoey, 1980; Griffin and Tversky, 1992; Tversky and Koehler, 1994).
It, therefore, follows that the success of the decomposition-recomposition
approach lies in the assumption that the “simple” probabilities elicited for
recomposition (often marginal and conditional probabilities, as in the cross-
impact technology) are themselves free of bias. If systematic error exists in
these simple assessments then recomposition will magnify this bias.
Some influences on the assessed quality of judgement
Good calibration has been demonstrated in a number of instances but most
notably in weather forecasting. We (Bolger and Wright, 1994) proposed that
a skilled judge can give valid probability estimates if the task, elicitation and
assessment procedures are amenable. Specifically, we proposed that invalid
probability judgements arise when:
1. Valid probability judgement cannot easily be learned. This may be due
to such influences as the amount and complexity of information, the
degree to which events to be judged are related to an underlying domain
model (e.g. likelihood of rain to a model of the weather) and (perhaps
most importantly) the lack of outcome feedback in the task domain
upon which to base and revise judgement. We term these task influences
learnability.
2. The judge is unskilled due to lack of knowledge about the task domain
and/or probability laws.
3. Probability estimates are elicited in a manner which makes them unrepre-
sentative of the judges’ true feelings of subjective probability; for example,
by asking him or her to respond in an unfamiliar metric (such as odds to
a non-betting person).
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One instance where judgemental probability forecasts are routinely gener-
ated is weather forecasting. The official forecasts issued by the National
Weather Service in the United States are subjective probability forecasts.
Murphy and Brown (1985) have evaluated these subjective forecasts and
found that, for certain categories of weather, they were more accurate than
the available objective statistical techniques. In this case, the experimental
forecasters have a very large amount of information available, including the
output from statistical techniques (cf factor 2). They also receive detailed
feedback (cf factor 1) and have the opportunity to gain experience of
making forecasts under a wide range of meteorological conditions. Further-
more, they have considerable practice in quantifying their internal state of
uncertainty (cf factor 3). These circumstances may well be ideal for the rela-
tively successful application of judgemental compared to purely quantitative
forecasting.
In our view, performance-demonstrated experience in probability judge-
ments is underpinned by practice and regular performance feedback. How-
ever, as Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) have argued, most judgements are
made without the benefit of accurate feedback. They identified three main
problems:
1. The lack of search for and use of disconfirming evidence.
2. The use of unaided memory for coding, sorting and retrieving outcome
information.
3. When people take an action based on a forecast in order to facilitate or
avoid possible futures, they can often only observe feedback associated
with the action taken, and not the action not taken.
To illustrate (3), Einhorn (1980) gives the following example:
Imagine that you are a waiter in a busy restaurant and because you cannot
give good service to all the people at your station, you make a judge-
ment regarding which people will leave good or poor tips. You then give
good or bad service depending on your judgement. If the quality of ser-
vice, in itself, has an effect on the size of the tip, outcome feedback will
“confirm the predictions” (“They looked cheap and left no tip – just as
I thought”). The extent of such self-fulfilling prophecies is much greater
than we think and represents a considerable obstacle to learning from
outcome feedback.
This third feedback problem is, of course, immaterial in contexts such as
weather forecasting where actions cannot be taken to increase or reduce the
likelihood of the forecast event. Unconfounded feedback in such circum-
stances is likely to prove more useful for the improvement of forecasting
ability.
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Wagenaar and Keren (1986) further point out that feedback must be
attended to in order for it to be of any use in improving judgement. They
show that blackjack dealers were no better calibrated than “lay” people for
judgements about the frequency of occurrence of certain types of hand,
despite being exposed to thousands of examples each working week. They
suggest that this finding is due to lack of motivation on the part of black-
jack dealers to attend to the outcome feedback available to them. It is now
well known that attention to the target stimuli is a necessary condition for
learning about the frequency of occurrence of those stimuli.
Murphy and Brown (1985) have argued that the presence of actual or
potential users of judgemental weather forecasts provides the forecasters
with a strong motivation for conducting the forecasting process in an
efficient and more effective manner. Moreover, feedback from users of fore-
casts frequently contains information regarding possible improvements.
The use of judgement in real-world forecasting thus contrasts strongly
with the study of judgement in the psychological laboratory, where cali-
bration feedback and incentives for good performance have seldom been
utilized.
The metric in which probability responses are elicited can take a number
of different forms (e.g. percentages, point probability estimates, odds, rel-
ative frequency, etc.). Depending on which metric is used, the judge’s task
of turning subjective feelings of uncertainty into measurable/usable numeric
estimates can be either helped or hindered. For example, Wright et al. (1988)
found that for a short-term forecasting task of impersonal events (e.g. “will
the pound fall below one dollar in the next 2 months?”), 29 out 36 students
were better calibrated on point probabilities than odds. This experiment,
therefore, gives some empirical support for the view that point probability
estimates, not odds, should be elicited from untrained forecasters.
So far in this discussion of elicitation and assessment effects, we have
not differentiated between the sorts of probability estimates that are being
elicited (e.g. marginal or conditional? simple or complex? intersections or
disjunctions?) because calibration studies have not tended to differenti-
ate either. However, it seems to us that an important research question is
the extent to which it is more natural to make some sort of probability
assessments than others.
Decomposition implies that “simple” probabilities, such as marginals and
conditionals, are easier for judges to assess than “complex” probabilities,
such as intersections, disjunctions and unions. However, our earlier discus-
sion of decomposition-recomposition found little evidence of a distinction
between simple and complex assessed probabilities in terms of calibration
performance. One possible reason for this rather surprising finding is that
the problem decomposition used may not have been appropriate for the
judges. In other words, the judges may have been framing the problem dif-
ferently to the experimenter so that the decomposition did not result in
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easier-to-assess probabilities. Of course, a characteristic of expertise is surely
that experts can discriminate questions of a type they can answer from those
they cannot (see Shanteau, 1992).
Section conclusion
In order to reduce potential invalidity due to features of the task domain,
we propose that a thorough task analysis should be performed before proba-
bilities are elicited. Questions to be addressed include the following: has the
judge had the opportunity to attain good probability through experience of
feedback? How long is the feedback loop? Is the feedback loop sensitive to
treatment effects? To what extent are items/events related? and is it possible
to validate judgements against some external standard? If the conclusion of
the task analysis is that the conditions for learnability are not present in the
task domain, and/or there are no available objective criteria for validating
probabilistic judgement (perhaps because the events to be forecast are in the
far future), then the only strategy is to ensure judgements are coherent. As
we have argued, in the absence of validity measures the decision analyst can
only ensure such coherence.
One practical step that can be taken to ensure that the elicitation pro-
cess influences the validity of probabilistic judgement as little as possible is
to encourage judges to decompose the problem in their own preferred way,
using their own preferred response. In some forecasting situations, it may be
that the assessor will feel happier assessing marginal and conditional prob-
abilities than compound probabilities (cf the playing card example, earlier).
However, as we have argued, in other situations the forecaster may feel more
comfortable assessing compound probabilities directly. Overall, perhaps the
most flexible approach to debiasing subjective probability forecasts would
be to adopt what Keren (1990) calls structure-modifying techniques, where
the user is forced/encouraged to understand the internal logic of a particular
debiasing technique rather than follow a procedure blindly.
Expert judgement of risk
In a pioneering paper, Lichtenstein et al. (1978) investigated how well people
(students and convenience samples from the lay population) could estimate
the frequency of the lethal events that they may encounter in life.
In their study, Lichtenstein et al. (1978) found that although their sub-
jects exhibited some competence in judging such frequencies – frequency
estimates increased with increases in true frequency – the overall accuracy
of both (1) paired comparisons of the relative frequency of lethal events
and (2) direct estimates of frequencies of individual events were poor. In a
comment on the Lichtenstein et al. study, Shanteau (1978) argued that if
respondents had had more experience with the lethal events the validity of
the required estimates may have shown improvement. He concluded that “It
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might also be of some value to investigate judgement of lethal events, using
subjects who have direct knowledge and exposure to such events (such as
life insurance analysts)” (1978: p. 581).
Since the 1978 paper, research on risk judgements has led to the generally
accepted conclusion that expert judgements are, indeed, more veridical than
those of the general public (e.g. Slovic, 1987, 1999). One basis for this argu-
ment is the work by Slovic et al. (1985). In this study, the authors utilized
samples of the US League of Women Voters, university students, members
of the US Active Club (an organization of business and professional peo-
ple devoted to community services activities) and a group of professional
“experts”. Perceptions of risk were measured by asking participants to order
the 30 hazards from least to most risky (in terms of the “risk of dying (across
US Society as a whole) as a consequence of this activity or technology”)
(1985: p. 116). Participants were told to assign a numerical value of 10 to the
least risky item and to make other ratings relative to this value. Since these
instructions called for a risk assessment, rather than a (relative) frequency
estimate (cf Lichtenstein et al., 1978), the avenue was open – for both experts
and nonexperts – for qualitative risk attributes, such as the voluntary nature
or controllability of the risk, to enter into these global risk judgements.
Slovic et al. (1985) concluded that the judgement of their experts dif-
fered substantially from non-expert judgement primarily because the experts
employed a much greater range of values to discriminate among the vari-
ous hazards that they were asked to assess, which included motor vehicles,
smoking, alcoholic beverages, hand guns, surgery, X-rays and nuclear power.
Additionally, Slovic et al. (1985) concluded that their obtained expert-lay
differences were “because most experts equate risk with something akin
to yearly fatalities, whereas lay people do not” (1985: p. 95). This con-
clusion is founded on the fact that the obtained correlations between
perceived risk and the annual frequencies of death were 0.62, 0.50 and
0.56 for the League of Women Voters, students and Active Club samples,
respectively. The correlation of 0.92 obtained within the expert sample
is significantly higher than those obtained within each of the lay sam-
ples. However, Slovic et al. (1985) also found that both the lay and expert
groupings viewed the hazards similarly on qualitative characteristics such
as voluntariness of risk, control over risk and severity of consequences –
when asked directly to do so (see Rowe and Wright, 2001, for a full discus-
sion). It would seem that when asked for a “risk” estimate, Slovic et al.’s
experts viewed this as a magnitude estimation task rather than a qual-
itative evaluation task. Additionally, an artificial ceiling may have been
placed on the evaluation of the veracity of magnitude estimates of risk
made by the lay samples, if members of the lay groupings were more
likely to view the task of making a “risk” estimate as one of qualitative
evaluation.
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Since Slovic et al.’s (1985) study of expert-lay differences in risk judgement,
several other papers have taken a similar theme. These have used expert
samples of toxicologists (Kraus et al., 1992; Slovic et al., 1995), computer sci-
entists (Gutteling and Kuttschreuter, 1999), nuclear scientists (Flynn et al.,
1993), aquatic scientists (McDaniels et al., 1997), loss prevention managers
in oil and gas production (Wright et al., 2000) and scientists in general (Barke
and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). These studies concluded that there are substantial
differences in the way that experts and samples of the lay population judge
risk. Generally, experts perceive the risks as less than the lay public with
regard to the questions asked and the substantive domains. The two excep-
tions are the studies by Wright et al. (2000) – where experts and members
of the lay public shared similarities in risk perception of hazardous events
in oil and gas production in the North Sea, and Mumpower et al. (1987),
where the rating of the political riskiness of countries by undergraduate stu-
dents closely paralleled the ratings of professional analysts. Both these sets of
results contrast sharply with results of Slovic et al. (1985), described earlier,
where the experts saw 26 out of 30 activities/technologies as more risky than
each of the three lay groupings. However, in all studies, except for the latter
study, the relative validity of expert versus lay risk assessments (in terms of
the veracity of frequency estimates) has not been measured – hence, the com-
monly accepted view about expert-lay differences in risk judgements rests on
the results of a single study that used just 15 experts and which compared
their judgements of “risk” with those of groups of lay persons on a task
where the validity standard (mortality rates) was not made salient to the lay
group. Further, it would seem highly unlikely that the experts who took part
in the Slovic et al. study could have had substantive expert knowledge in all
of the variety of hazards that were utilized (including mountain climbing,
nuclear power and spray cans), which begs the question: Were they truly
experts? This might also, in part, explain why the results from this expert
sample were inconsistent with the results from expert samples in the other
studies. In a review of these studies, Rowe and Wright (2001) concluded that,
contrary to received wisdom, there is little empirical evidence for the propo-
sition that experts are more veridical in their risk assessments than members
of the public.
More widely, Bolger and Wright (1994) and Rowe and Wright (2001) have
argued that in many real-world tasks, apparent expertise (as indicated by,
for example, status) may have little relationship to any real judgement skill
at the task in question. In Bolger and Wright’s review of studies of expert
judgemental performance they found that only six had showed “good” per-
formance by experts, while nine had shown poor performance. As we have
seen in section 1 of this chapter, Bolger and Wright analysed and then inter-
preted this pattern of performance in terms of the “ecological validity” and
“learnability” of the tasks that were posed to the experts. To reprise, by “eco-
logical validity” we mean the degree to which the experts were required to
GeorgeWright et al. 223
make judgements inside the domain of their professional experience and/or
express their judgements in familiar metrics. By “learnability” we mean the
degree to which it is possible for good judgement to be learned in the task
domain. That is, if objective data and models and/or reliable and usable feed-
back are unavailable, then it may not be possible for a judge in that domain
to improve his or her performance significantly with experience. In such
cases, Bolger and Wright argued, the performance of novices and “experts”
is likely to be equivalent, and they concluded that expert performance will
be largely a function of the interaction between the dimensions of ecolog-
ical validity and learnability – if both are high then good performance will
be manifest, but if one or both are low then performance will be poor.
From the perspective of Bolger and Wright’s analysis, it is by no means
certain that expert risk assessors will be better at judging the veridical risks
of hazards than lay persons, and the limited empirical evidence cannot be
considered compelling (Rowe and Wright, 2001). This has important impli-
cations for the communication of judgements of risk. As Rowe and Wright
(2001) have argued, in hazard evaluations where the hazardous events hap-
pen rarely, if at all, then learnability will be low, and the veridicality of
judgements of the magnitude of risks by experts will be suspect. For example,
consider the validity of expert predictive judgements about the likelihood
magnitude of human infection by “mad cow disease” resulting from eat-
ing beef from herds infected with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
in the early 1990s and the subsequent, poorly predicted, mortality rates
(Maxwell, 1999). In this instance, UK politicians selectively used expert
predictions to reassure a frightened general public.
Wright et al. (2002) considered the issue of expert-lay differences in fre-
quency, and relative frequency, judgements of lethal events using a sample
of professional risk assessors. They extended and developed the study of
Lichtenstein et al. (1978) and followed up the suggestion in Shanteau’s
(1978) commentary on that paper. They utilized a sample of life underwrit-
ers, of varying degrees of experience, and a task requiring assessment of a
varied set of potentially lethal events.
The results from their study revealed that although both lay and expert
groups showed relatively good performance in terms of the ordering of the
absolute likelihood (marginal probabilities) and lethality (conditional proba-
bilities) of events, as demonstrated by significant obtained correlations, they
also showed similar and systematic bias in terms of overestimating these val-
ues. Such overestimation was almost uniform over the hazards for the direct
marginal judgements, although less so for conditionals. The student group
was no worse at direct marginal or direct conditional estimation than the
experts.
Because the direct estimation of risks associated with potentially lethal
events is an unusual task, even for the experts (at least for marginal esti-
mates, although for conditional estimates the Chief Underwriter stated
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that this assessment mode captured the essence of his work-a-day task),
we also obtained marginal and conditional estimates in a second, indirect
way, namely, through pairwise comparisons. Correlational analysis revealed
a trend that the experts were indeed better at the task, in terms of identify-
ing which events of the pairs led to more deaths (marginals) and were more
lethal (conditionals), although these correlations were not significantly dif-
ferent from those of the lay group. However, further analysis revealed that
the experts did make significantly better judgements than lay person on
marginal estimates in terms of ratios (i.e. the number of times one event was
more likely to cause death than another) and conditionals (i.e. the number
of times an event was more likely to cause death than the other, given that
the event happens to someone). In spite of this, both lay persons and experts
made the same general errors in the pairwise comparison tasks – namely, in
underestimating the ratio of more-to-less ubiquitous and fatal hazards by
overly compressing their ranges of estimates.
Section conclusion
As we have reviewed, the evidence for experts being better at the judge-
ments of risks is not strong (see Rowe and Wright, 2001 for a review) and
yet has been so readily accepted that there has been no apparent effort
to research the topic further. For “true” expertise to be manifest (expertise
related to performance, as opposed to social and political imperatives), Bol-
ger and Wright (1994) have argued that the expert must perform a task that
is ecologically valid, and the task must also be learnable. Wright et al. (2002)
attempted to ensure that their expert-task match was as strong as possi-
ble (given experimental limitations), and that ecological validity was high,
and yet still obtained expert performance that was not much better than
lay person performance. This result suggests that the underwriting task is
not truly “learnable”, i.e. it is not one for which there is regular feedback
on the correctness or otherwise of judgements. Indeed, in the training of
underwriters, performance is assessed according to the similarity of junior
underwriters’ judgements to those of their seniors (Bolger et al., 1989).
Once “trained”, underwriters receive infrequent performance-related, objec-
tive feedback about the correctness of their judgements, and indeed it would
be difficult to provide such feedback, given that a “poor” judgement might
turn out to be insuring an applicant who subsequently died of a condition
after perhaps 20 years of a 25-year policy.
We infer that the tasks performed by other professional risk assessors may
also be unlearnable. For example, in the case of major hazards in the nuclear
industry there may be no risk/judgement feedback at all. From this, we sug-
gest that expert-lay differences in the accuracy of such risk judgements, or
in the nature of such judgements (given that the biases evidenced in the
Wright et al. (2002) study were similar across lay and expert groups), can-
not be assumed. Further, even if experts are significantly more accurate than
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lay people, it may still be that differences in accuracy are small, as demon-
strated in the present study. Perhaps the commonsense assumption of the
superiority of expert risk assessors in making risk judgements is ill-founded.
Certainly, future research needs to pay more attention to the de facto nature
of the learnability of tasks performed by professional risk assessors.
Advice giving and changes in judgement: directions for
future research
Our general conclusion is that experts can make valid judgements of prob-
ability – if the task conditions are amenable. To make valid judgements,
we contend that a prediction/outcome feedback loop must be in place to
enable learnability. Also, the judgement task itself should be matched with
the expert’s knowledge base, and the metric used to elicit probability judge-
ments should be both familiar and acceptable to the expert. Such conditions
prevail in meteorologists’ predictions of weather events – where excellent
calibration is the rule. Similarly, in the domain of risk judgement, such task
conditions must, we contend, also prevail for valid judgements to be elicited
from experts. So, we conclude that the ideal situation for the expression of
valid judgement by experts is when (i) the ecological validity of both the
judgement task and the elicitation metric are both high and (ii) when the
task itself is truly learnable. In many situations, of course, the second condi-
tion may not hold and expert judgement will, we contend, likely be as poor
as that of the lay population and subject to similar heuristics and biases. In
these situations, there will exist no track-record of prior judgements or asso-
ciated hit-rate. Here, the judgements made are likely to be one-off or unique.
In such situations, the expert has only access to his/her heuristics and the
advice of other people – perhaps also experts. The advisors may disagree, so
how are/should such disagreements resolved?
Rowe and Wright (1999) studied change in expert opinion amongst mem-
bers of such expert groups and found that the experts who held the more
accurate opinions changed their opinions less than experts who held less
accurate opinions over rounds in a mediated group process called “Delphi”.
One avenue for future research is, therefore, the exchange of knowledge and
opinion between experts, but this research area is, as yet, under-explored.
For example, Brockriede and Ehninger (1960) have shown that only a
limited number of argument types are, in principle, available to people advo-
cating specific propositions or claims – arguments of parallel case, analogy,
motivation and authority.
In Analogous reasoning, the reason given makes use of our general knowl-
edge of relationships between two events in dissimilar situations. For exam-
ple, if someone is trying to estimate the time it will take to drive to a nearby
airport, an advisor may reason that “the airport is roughly the same distance
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away as the shopping mall. Therefore, the time it will take to get to the air-
port will be approximately the same as it is to travel to the shopping mall –
about 30 minutes.”
Parallel case reasoning involves making use of our knowledge of a previous
experience of a near identical situation. For example, if someone is trying
to estimate the time it will take to drive to a nearby airport an advisor may
reason that, “it will take about 30 minutes to drive to the airport because it
took me 30 minutes at the same time of day last month.”
Authoritative reasoning involves making use of substantive knowledge. For
example, “the radio announcer has said that traffic to the airport is heavy
today and so I estimate that you should add 20 minutes to your journey
time.”
Motivational reasoning involves making use of specific insights about peo-
ple’s motivations or desires. For example, “since you will be in a hurry, then
I reckon that you can cut five minutes off your usual journey time.”
Research has shown that these argument types can be persuasive in some
circumstances (McCroskey, 1969; Smith, 1972; Stanchi, 2006), but outside
a legal context, no research has been conducted to explore the persuasive-
ness effects of different forms of argument structure on opinion change in
experts. Thus, many crucial questions remain to be explored and answered.
For example, what components of advice-giving cause opinion-change in
individual experts? How is advice evaluated and under what conditions will
advice be assimilated or discounted? When one expert defers in his or her
own opinion to the well-argued opinion of another, is this an indicator
of the presence of valid advice that will improve validity in (the revised)
judgemental prediction? In our view, the study of the use of argument
in advice-giving will become a major topic in investigations focused on
understanding and improving expert judgement of probability and risk in
unique, or one-off, situations where the expert cannot utilize learnability,
and the expert is aware that his/her own judgement may be influenced by
inappropriate heuristics that could lead to bias.
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